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Abstract 
To address situations where commercial negotiations about access and interconnection fail, the 
Common Regulatory Framework requires national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to have power to 
resolve disputes between providers. The NRA can impose proportionate obligations. Describing 
dispute resolution as either a form of regulation in its own right or as simple adjudication is likely to 
mislead without some analysis of what is meant. There may be a tendency, when the NRA is resolving 
a dispute, to reflect an interventionist regulatory approach but there are markets that have effective 
competition and in which the regulator may properly tend towards resolving a dispute towards the 
adjudication end of the spectrum with a less interventionist approach. 
This paper reflects on principles that have been applied in the UK and on experience in appeals to and 
beyond the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Because the task of judges is to tackle the grounds of appeal 
raised before them, courts do not provide a comprehensive guide to NRAs as to how to handle the 
wide range of issues that can arise. The UK Supreme Court has emphasised the need for 
interconnection terms to be consistent with the objectives in Article 8 of the Framework Directive and, 
within boundaries set by Article 8, for national contract law is to be applied. 
Keywords 
Access, Article 4 appeals, Article 8 objectives, dispute resolution, interconnection 
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Opening quotations 
 “...the description of dispute resolution as “a form of regulation in its own right” is apt to mislead 
without some analysis of what is meant by it. As a national regulatory authority charged with the 
resolution of disputes, Ofcom has both regulatory and adjudicatory powers...” 
Lord Sumption in British Telecommunications (BT) v Telefónica [2014] UKSC 42 at [31] and [32] 
 “National regulatory authorities (NRAs) should have the power to secure, where commercial 
negotiation fails, adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of 
end-users. In particular, they may ensure end-to-end connectivity by imposing proportionate 
obligations on undertakings that control access to end- users”. 
From the Access Directive 2002/19/EC recital (6) 
“The scheme of the Directives has been considered on a number of occasions by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, notably in Case C-227/07 Commission of the European Communities v 
Republic of Poland [2008] ECR I-8403 and Case C-192/08 TeliaSonera Finland Oyj [2009] ECR I-
10717. It can fairly be summarised as follows. The objectives of the scheme are set out in Article 8 of 
the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), and in particular in Article 8.2, which assumes that consumer 
welfare will generally be achieved by competition and requires national regulatory authorities to 
promote both. The telecommunications sector is assumed to have become competitive except in those 
cases where a communications provider (CP) can be identified as having significant market power in a 
relevant market. In a competitive market, the objectives in Article 8 of the Framework Directive are to 
be achieved through the terms of the interconnection agreements between CPs. CPs operating in such 
a market are left to negotiate their own interconnection terms in good faith, with the minimum of 
regulatory interference. But they are required by Article 4.1 of the Access Directive to offer 
interconnection terms “consistent with the obligations imposed by the national regulatory authority 
pursuant to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8.” Under Article 5.4 of the Access Directive, these obligations of the 
regulator include its obligation to secure the policy objectives in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
The result is that interconnection terms consistent with the objectives in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive must be available to any CP which asks for them.” 
Lord Sumption in BT v Telefónica [2014] UKSC 42 at [10] 
1
 
                                                     
*
 © 2014 UK Competition Appeal Tribunal. Dr Scott is Director of Studies of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal but 
views expressed here are personal and should not be taken as an indication of what the Tribunal would decide upon 
considering argument. He is grateful to colleagues for comments upon earlier drafts. 
 This paper has been presented for the first time during the Seminar “The Place of the National Judiciary in the Single 
Market for Telecoms”, organised in Brussels by the Florence School of Regulation, Communications and Media Area, on 
behalf of the European Commission, DG CNECT, on Thursday 20th November 2014 (for further details on the event: 
http://fsr.eui.eu/Events/COMSnMEDIA/Conference/141120SeminarForNationalJudges.aspx) 
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 Article 5(4), Access Directive, like other parts of the CRF, was subsequently amended by Directive 2009/140/EC – see 
version in the Annex of what is now Article 5(3) 
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Learning to resolve disputes 
The language of the Access Directive is clear about the goal of securing end-to-end connectivity. Of 
course negotiations may fail and then, if one or more parties refer the matter to the NRA, it may 
pursue that goal through dispute resolution and thereby through imposing proportionate obligations. 
Dispute resolution has been part of the Common Regulatory Framework (CRF) from the start and the 
phrase “imposing proportionate obligations” may suggest a primarily regulatory function in public 
law. Nevertheless the term “dispute resolution” suggests adjudication between adversaries in private 
law albeit conditioned here by overall objectives in the CRF. As we proceed, we shall see how NRAs 
should promote consumer welfare, ideally through effectively competitive markets, and look at 
circumstances that permit an NRA to engage in regulatory intervention even when a market has been 
deemed to be effectively competitive. 
Although it is a decade since the dispute resolution process came into use, we are all still learning 
how to tackle some of the issues that the process throws up. Only a small minority of determinations 
get appealed. That appeal from a dispute resolution determination is, by virtue of article 4 Framework 
Directive, transposed in the UK in sections 192 & 195(2) of the Communications Act 2003, on the 
merits and not simply a judicial review.
2
 Of the appeals that reach hearing and judgment before the 
UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), again only a minority go further to the Court of Appeal of 
England & Wales. Only one case has gone to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 
Luxembourg on a reference for a preliminary ruling and only one case has gone to the UK Supreme 
Court. 
Because the task of judges is to tackle the grounds of appeal raised before them, courts do not 
provide a comprehensive guide to NRAs, let alone to their sibling courts in other Member States, as to 
how to handle the wide range of issues that can arise. When a multiplicity of grounds is raised the 
court may not find it necessary to decide upon every one. 
So what follows flows from the particularities of experience in the UK and, necessarily, it only 
provides a few pieces of a jigsaw puzzle where other pieces have yet to be cut, refined by appeals and 
fitted in. 
The sub-title reflects one question that arises throughout the process. It is that of the extent to 
which dispute resolution is a matter of adjudication between the disputing parties and the extent to 
which it engages the NRA in its regulatory role. The CRF has always recognised, see for instance 
recitals (25) – (28), Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, that some markets still have a lack of effective 
competition which means that there may be more of a tendency, when the NRA is resolving a dispute, 
to reflect an interventionist regulatory approach and that there are other markets which do have 
effective competition and in which the regulator may tend towards resolving a dispute towards the 
adjudication end of the spectrum with a less interventionist approach. 
Recital (32) Framework Directive, see Annex, not only uses the language of a “simple procedure” 
but it also uses the words “intervention” and “impose a solution” when it comes to ensuring that 
obligations imposed on parties by the CRF, who may not have the significant market power (SMP) 
discussed in (27), see Annex, are observed and customer benefits thereby achieved through access and 
interconnection. We shall see that, notwithstanding the opening words of (27), there are CRF 
obligations on parties without SMP as well as on those with SMP - obligations that an NRA and the 
courts must and will follow through in a dispute resolution process. 
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 See [2014] UKSC 42 at [13] and [24]; the situation is more complicated when dealing with price control matters flowing 
from a finding of significant market power; see s.193 in general and s.193(7) in particular. 
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From the point of view of the main players in the telecommunications industry, the issues raised in 
these cases are of great importance to the players, to the regulator and ultimately to competition and to 
consumers. Although costs of employing lawyers and economists to fight appeals may seem 
substantial, they are often dwarfed by the amounts of money in dispute. It follows that fights over 
what is reasonable, or cost oriented matter to the parties and ultimately to consumers and therefore 
require close attention from the judges concerned. 
Dispute resolution: the EU CRF 
For convenience, the more relevant recitals and articles from the Access Directive 2002/19/EC and the 
Framework Directive, as each has been amended, of the EU’s CRF are set out in the Annex.  
NRAs provide dispute resolution within a national transposition of those articles. As the Tribunal 
explained in [2008] CAT 12 at [20] in relation to the then wording of Article 5, Access Directive, 
providing for Powers and responsibilities of the national regulatory authorities with regard to access 
and interconnection, an initiative for NRA action could come from the NRA itself or from one or 
more parties in dispute but, in either case, the NRA must secure the objectives of Article 8, 
Framework Directive: 
“Article 5(4)
3
... requires Member States to confer two powers on the national regulatory authority; 
the power to intervene either on its own initiative or at the request of the parties to a dispute in 
order to secure the policy objectives referred to. Both articles 20 and 5(4) refer to the policy 
objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. Article 8 of the Framework Directive 
sets out the policy objectives and regulatory principles of which the NRAs are required to take the 
utmost account in carrying out their tasks under the Framework Directive and the Specific 
Directives.” 
The CRF provides for dispute resolution as a swift alternative to using the courts without ignoring the 
possibility of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). However, if a series of appeals to successive levels 
occurs, then the process usually takes more than months in any Member State. 
Setting the scene in the UK in the context of the EU 
The UK NRA, the Office of Communications (Ofcom in this piece for readability, though OFCOM in 
the Communications Act 2003), is the body that has primary responsibility for dispute resolution 
under the UK transposition of article 20 Framework Directive (reproduced in Annex A) in Chapter 3 
of the Act. Sections 185-191 deal with the procedure before Ofcom and then sections 192 and 195 are 
the transposition of article 4 dealing with appeals to the CAT. Section 196 provides for an appeal on a 
point of law, normally to the Court of Appeal of England & Wales, and, from there, the UK Supreme 
Court may choose to hear a further appeal. 
On a further appeal it is not necessary for Ofcom to be the Respondent
4
 as these may be essentially 
inter partes proceedings but Ofcom may appear as an interested party as it did before the Supreme 
Court in BT v Telefónica and others [2014] UKSC 42. 
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 Article 5(4), like other parts of the CRF, was subsequently amended by Directive 2009/140/EC – see version in the 
Annex of what is now Article 5(3) which now leaves dispute resolution to be mentioned elsewhere. This paper is not the 
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Framework Directive. 
4
 As for example in BT v Ofcom [2012] EWCA Civ 1051 contrasted with BT v Telefónica and others [2014] UKSC 42 and 
before that Telefónica and others v BT [2012] EWCA Civ 1002 in which Ofcom appeared only as an interested party. 
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By virtue of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the 
CAT, the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court may refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling
5
 – the question may relate to the proper construction of the Directives constituting the Common 
Regulatory Framework; in relation to dispute resolution this power has only been used on one 
occasion. A question for preliminary was referred by the Court of Appeal to the CJEU, Case C-16/10 
The Number, (1100), on questions associated with the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC. The 
Court (Third Chamber) ruled that:  
“Article 8(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services (Universal Service Directive) permits Member States, where they decide to designate one 
or more undertakings under that provision to guarantee the provision of universal service, or 
different elements of universal service, as identified in Articles 4 to 7 and 9(2) of that same 
directive, to impose on such undertakings only (emphasis added) the specific obligations, provided 
for in the directive, which are associated with the provision of that service, or elements thereof, to 
end-users by the designated undertakings themselves.” 
Parties and binding effects 
Almost inevitably many disputes have involved the previous PTT monopolist, once part of the British 
Post Office, now BT, either as a provider or as a customer; other “frequent flyers” are the mobile 
network operators (MNOs): Everything Everywhere (EE) (the merged entity of the operators that were 
owned by France Télecom, Orange, and by Deutsche Telekon, T-Mobile), Three (Hutchison 3G), 
Telefónica and Vodafone; also BT’s original fixed line competitor, now Cable & Wireless Worldwide. 
The other multiple appellant is The Number UK who operate the directory service known as 118118. 
These frequent appellants have recently been joined by British Sky Broadcasting, by TalkTalk, the 
latter having started as a fixed line operator and become a provider of a range of services often using 
BT infrastructure, and most recently by Gamma who provide business oriented services.
6
 
Technically a determination is only binding upon the parties to the dispute that Ofcom has resolved 
but it is worth mentioning the following passage from a determination published on 21 August 2014: 
“5.128  This determination is binding on BT, Vodafone, Telefónica and Three (Hutchison 3G). 
Since a subsequent dispute with similar facts is likely to result in a similar decision (given our 
application of the Guidance and our statutory duties, including our duty to have regard to the 
principle that regulatory activities should be consistent), we would expect this determination to be 
read across and followed in situations where a third party is facing similar questions and 
circumstances to these Disputes.” 
Dispute between BT and each of Vodafone, Telefónica and Three relating to forward looking call origination 
charges for 080 numbers  
Ofcom reference: CW/01126/04/14 
Dispute resolution and SMP remedies 
Disputes arise in the context of an overall expectation that operators should negotiate in good faith to 
provide interconnection so that customers benefit from end-to-end connectivity. Unlike the ex ante 
remedies that flow from a finding of SMP, and though disputes may arise within the framework of ex 
ante remedies, dispute resolution does not require such a finding of SMP. The Competition Appeal 
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 In BT v Telefónica [2014] UKSC 42 at [50], referring back to [47-48], Lord Sumption explains the logic of NOT making 
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in his judgment “The recognition that the interconnection terms are the starting point does not itself warrant a reference, 
since the centrality of the interconnection terms in the scheme of the Directives is obvious and no convincing reason has 
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Tribunal made that point clear in Hutchison 3G v Ofcom [2005] CAT 39 at [129-130] and reiterated it 
in T-Mobile v Ofcom [2008] CAT 12 at [90-91]. 
Recent activity before Ofcom and the CAT 
To get a sense of the level of activity, Ofcom recently reported on the work of their Competition 
Investigations team in resolving regulatory disputes between companies.  
“During 2013/14, we resolved seven disputes covering a wide range of topics, including BT’s 
tiered wholesale charges for number translation services, used to route non-geographic calls, and 
whether Openreach should offer a single ‘jumpered’ metallic path facility – a type of equipment in 
the local telephone exchange. ... As at 1 April 2014 there were a further four ongoing dispute 
cases, three of which have since been resolved. These disputes looked at issues ranging from BT’s 
compliance with its cost-orientation obligations for certain wholesale products to service level 
agreements for local loop unbundling services.”  
Extract from Ofcom’s Annual Report 2013/14 
Of those seven disputes only the “Determination to resolve disputes concerning BT’s tiered 
termination charges in NCCNs (network charge change notices) 1101, 1107 and 1046” dated 4th April 
2013 led to an appeal (CAT case number 1211). That appeal was stayed pending the decision of the 
Supreme Court mentioned below but it is now proceeding and is sub judice.  
Another appeal that was also stayed is 1195, now sub judice, and that is against an Ofcom 
determination dated 2
nd
 April 2012 as to the repayment that Vodafone has to make to BT for charges 
for terminating calls to 080, 0845 and 0870 numbers under the Tribunal’s judgment [2011] CAT 24 of 
1
st
 August 2011 on appeals by BT and EE against Ofcom’s determinations of disputes relating to 
termination charges for 080, 0845 and 0870 calls – the appeal from which went to the Supreme Court. 
2014/15 
Since last year Ofcom have had more disputes to handle and, so far, it has published six 
determinations, only one of which has been appealed to date: 
 Disputes between TalkTalk and BT and Sky and BT relating to whether BT provided MPF New 
Provide (that is the provision of a new metallic path owned by BT but used for the provision of 
services by a competing provider) on fair and reasonable terms and conditions: this led to two 
parallel, related, determinations issued on 22
nd
 April 2014; and also to withdrawal of TalkTalk’s 
appeal in 2013 on MPF New Provide, CAT case number 1221; 
 Determination to resolve dispute between Gamma and BT concerning BT's charges for 
Interconnect Extension Circuits: issued on 23rd May 2014; this determination was appealed by 
Gamma on 23
rd
 July 2014 but stayed pending the outcome of the Ethernet appeals (see below); 
 Dispute between Level 3 Communications UK Limited and BT relating to historic partial private 
circuit charges: determination issued in corrected form on 6
th
 July 2014 
 Determination under sections 188 and 190 of the Communications Act 2003 for resolving 
disputes between BT and each of Vodafone, Telefónica and Three concerning BT’s proposed 
origination charges for calls to 080 number issued on 21
st
 August2014 
 Dispute between Cloud9 and Telefónica concerning additional charges for delivery of roaming 
calls: determination issued 30
th
 September 2014. 
As at the start of November 2014, there were two disputes currently under consideration by Ofcom: 
one relating to roaming under the UK transposition of Regulation (EU) No. 531/2012 and one on 
Adam Scott 
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termination rates for 03 numbers. Any new investigations or disputes would be announced on the 
website and via email alerts in the usual way.
7
 
Looking back over the past decade 
Since the CRF came into force there have been 25 appeals to the CAT concerning dispute resolution.  
Some appeals get withdrawn fairly early on (CAT cases numbered 1057, 1063, 1064, 1167 and 
1221), some once a preliminary point has been decided (CAT case number 1080), or where Ofcom 
acknowledge an error (CAT case number 1113); some concern Ofcom’s jurisdiction rather than the 
substance of what is in dispute (CAT cases numbered 1057, 1171 and 1172). 
Termination Rate Disputes [2008] CAT 12 
Sometimes more than one party appeals in respect of the same decision by Ofcom. In one series of 
appeals concerned with disputes about mobile call termination, CAT cases numbered 1089-1093, there 
had been two determinations covering, in all, seven disputes; the appellants were BT, T-Mobile, 
Hutchison 3G UK and a group of fixed network operators led by Cable & Wireless. 
Those cases led to a preliminary judgment on what were called the core issues, [2008] CAT 12, a 
judgment that should now be read in the context of the 2014 Supreme Court judgment – see below. 
The Tribunal found that Ofcom had made a number of errors of law in the way it went about 
determining the disputes in circumstances where there had been findings of SMP held by MNOs 
reflected in Ofcom’s statement dated 1 June 2004 on Wholesale Mobile Call Termination. Ofcom had 
imposed price controls on calls terminated on 2G networks but – at the relevant time – not on calls 
terminated on 3G networks. This gave rise to disputes as to the proper charges. By the time the 
Tribunal heard these appeals it was also seized of appeals against the next Ofcom statement on 
Wholesale Mobile Call Termination, that of 2007; the Tribunal heard them all together. 
The Tribunal, at [83], made it clear that the challenges raised by the appellants were fundamental 
and that the grounds of appeal went far beyond alleging errors of appreciation. It was not, therefore, a 
case in which the Tribunal needed to explore the circumstances in which it would or would not be 
appropriate for it to interfere with the exercise by Ofcom of its discretion. 
The Tribunal held that the four appeals were well founded in so far as they related to certain issues 
in the appeals, referred to as the “core issues”, some of which were of general application: 
 In particular the Tribunal found that Ofcom must approach dispute resolution having regard to 
all its statutory obligations (reflecting, in particular, those in article 8, Framework Directive, and 
sections 3 and 4 of the UK Communications Act 2003) and not focus unduly on the existence of 
other regulatory constraints imposed on one or other of the parties to the dispute, such as BT’s 
end-to-end connectivity obligation. The Tribunal noted that Ofcom failed to recognise that 
dispute resolution is itself a third potential regulatory restraint that operates in addition to other 
ex ante obligations and ex post competition law, see [83] and [84]. Nowadays therefore Ofcom is 
careful to explain that its determinations are consistent with its statutory duties, as, for example, 
in paragraphs 5.129-5.131 of a determination published on 21 August 2014, mentioned above. 
 The Tribunal also found that Ofcom erred in drawing too rigid a boundary between the exercise 
of its dispute resolution powers and its SMP-related powers. The Tribunal held that Ofcom had 
erred in rejecting any form of cost based analysis of the reasonableness of the price comparison. 
The Tribunal explained the way through, relating prices and costs in this context as follows:  
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“103.  The Tribunal notes that Ofcom’s statements in the Disputes Determinations 
were made in the context of rejecting arguments put forward by the FNOs and H3G that 
Ofcom should set a cost based price. The Tribunal agrees with Ofcom to the extent that 
it decided that it was not bound, in the course of resolving a dispute referred to it under 
section 185, to set a price reflecting the costs of providing the service. However, the 
Tribunal accepts BT’s argument that the Determinations went further than this and that 
Ofcom erred in drawing too rigid a boundary between the exercise of its dispute 
resolution powers and its SMP-related powers.” 
“104.  Ofcom was wrong to disregard entirely the relationship between prices and 
costs in this case. There is an underlying assumption in the Disputes Determinations 
that there is no middle ground between eschewing analysis of the relationship of price 
to cost completely on the one hand and a full investigation of costs of the kind carried 
out as part of the SMP market review on the other. The Tribunal does not accept that 
there is such a strict dichotomy. It should be possible to carry out some investigation of 
costs to form a broad idea of what that relationship is. Such an assessment may or may 
not give rise to a cost based price. It may simply result in Ofcom concluding that the 
price proposed is a reasonable one even though that price was not arrived at on a cost 
basis. The costs are not only relevant when setting a “strictly cost based price” but are 
likely to be a factor to a greater or lesser    extent in most cases where the dispute 
between the parties concerns price.” 
 The Tribunal held that Ofcom had placed too much weight on the need for consistency and erred 
in relying on the conclusions in its statement dated 1 June 2004 on Wholesale Mobile Call 
Termination without properly weighing the factors which the appellants argued meant that these 
conclusions were no longer valid. The Tribunal said, at [99]: 
“given the length of time that had elapsed since the publication of the 2004 Statement 
and the important changes that had occurred in the market Ofcom should have looked 
afresh at whether approval of the rates proposed was consistent with its wider duties.” 
 The Tribunal held that Ofcom’s interpretation of the purpose of the end-to-end connectivity 
obligation was too narrow. The purpose of that obligation was not just to achieve 
interconnection, but to do so in a manner which promotes, or at least is not inconsistent with, 
other regulatory objectives (see [116]). 
 The Tribunal provided guidance on how Ofcom should approach the task of resolving disputes 
in future. Of the test to be applied, the Tribunal said, at [101]: 
“That test can be expressed as requiring Ofcom to determine what are reasonable terms 
and conditions as between the parties. The word “reasonable” in this context means two 
things. First it requires a fair balance to be struck between the interests of the parties to 
the connectivity agreement. It therefore requires the same kind of adjudication that any 
arbitrator appointed by the parties to determine a dispute about the reasonable rate 
would carry out. But secondly, because Ofcom is a regulator bound by its statutory 
duties and the Community requirements it also means reasonable for the purposes of 
ensuring that those objectives and requirements are achieved. Ofcom did not approach 
resolving these disputes on this basis and it therefore committed an error of law.” 
 The Tribunal went on later to say: 
117.  In any event we do not consider that it is right to interpret the use of the term 
“reasonable” as it is used in the end-to-end connectivity obligation in such a narrow 
sense as to mean the highest price which could be charged which would still result in 
BT not making a loss. There is no reason to give the word anything other than its 
ordinary meaning; the price that it is fair should prevail as between the parties taking 
into account all the circumstances including in particular the arguments put forward in 
the dispute by the parties, Ofcom’s statutory duties and the Community requirements set 
out in the 2003 Act (see paragraph [101] above). 
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Some appeals are dismissed both by the CAT and by the Court of Appeal ; for example, CAT case 
number 1146, Partial Private Circuits; the hearing in that case ran to six days and the Tribunal’s 
judgment, [2011] CAT 5, ran to 340 paragraphs but no grounds of appeal were upheld.  
Telefónica [2012] CAT 28 
There may be cases that flow from SMP remedies. One such was an appeal by Telefónica concerning 
a determination by Ofcom of a dispute between Telefónica and each of Hutchison 3G and Vodafone 
dated 14 September 2011 and to do with termination charges levied in October 2010 and a practice 
known as “flip-flopping”, by which mobile communications providers (CPs) exploited the way in 
which average call termination charges were calculated under Ofcom’s mobile call termination 
statement published on 27 March 2007 (CAT case number 1189 leading to judgment [2012] CAT 28) 
rejecting each of Telefónica’s grounds of appeal and deciding, inter alia, that: 
 Ofcom had clearly understood that dispute resolution constituted a separate limb of regulation, 
distinct from the pre-existing charge control regime. 
 Ofcom had given consideration to the question of whether the October 2010 charges were fair 
and reasonable in the light of all of its regulatory duties and objectives, and in light of the 
prevailing regulatory regime. 
 There was no error of law on Ofcom’s part in giving predominant weight to Vodafone’s and 
H3G’s putative compliance with the SMP regime, and in the absence of any error of law the 
weight to be attached to relevant factors was a matter for Ofcom alone. 
 In the absence of any specific complaint of non-compliance with the SMP regime, Ofcom was 
free to decide whether to investigate that aspect of the matter, or whether to proceed on the 
assumption that the disputed charges, viewed in the context of the financial year as a whole, 
complied with the charge control. In the Tribunal’s judgment, it was eminently reasonably for 
Ofcom to decide to proceed on the latter basis. 
Ladder Pricing in the Supreme Court [2014] UKSC 42 
As mentioned above, to date, only one set of appeals, (on 080, 0845 and 0870 termination charges), 
has gone all the way to the Supreme Court (CAT cases numbered 1151, 1168 and 1169) started in 
2010 and culminated, four years later, in [2014] UKSC 42, a judgment allowing BT's appeal and 
restoring the Tribunal's judgment of 1 August 2011.  
This is a case in which Lord Sumption, at [48], drew a clear distinction between the review of 
markets for SMP and consequent remedies and dispute resolution, saying: 
“There is an important difference between (i) exercising a regulatory power to impose price 
control in order to correct market failure or control the abuse of a dominant economic position, 
and (ii) deciding whether a particular proposed tariff change advances consumer welfare for the 
purpose of determining whether there is a right to introduce it.” 
The case concerned the flow of funds between mobile network operators and BT, as a fixed network 
operator, when calls are originated on a mobile network for termination on non-geographic numbers in 
the 08 series. BT has long had a pattern of charges for its fixed line customers in which calls to 080 
numbers are free to the caller; 0845 numbers are charged at local rates and 0870 numbers at national 
rates. BT does not have a monopoly in the provision of such non-geographic numbers (even though it 
has a monopoly of delivering calls to its current customers
8
). There was no finding of BT having SMP 
in this market and therefore no remedy under articles 8-13, Access Directive. Mobile operators have 
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tended to charge significantly more for all of these numbers when calls are originated on a mobile 
telephone. It follows that attractive margins can be earned. 
BT provided termination of these calls to the mobile operators on the terms of its Standard 
Interconnect Agreement. That contract permitted BT to vary the charges subject, in a reflection of the 
CRF, to a determination by Ofcom in the event of dispute.
9
 Essentially, in 2009, BT decided that it 
would like to share in those attractive margins by devising termination rates that varied in accordance 
with the rates charged to their customers by the mobile operators. Understandably the mobile 
operators were reluctant to sacrifice their attractive margins, refused to agree and so a series of 
disputes went to Ofcom for resolution.  
As Lord Sumption put it at [20] (the layout of which has been altered below for clarity of the 
principles and sub-principles): 
“Ofcom decided that it would permit the changes to be made only if they were “fair and 
reasonable”, judged by three governing principles.  
Principle 1 was that mobile network operators should be able to recover their efficient costs of 
originating calls to the relevant numbers.  
Principle 2 was that the new charges should  
i. provide benefits to consumers, and  
ii. not entail a material distortion of competition.  
Principle 3 was that implementation of the new charges should be reasonably practicable.  
All three principles can be related to objectives set out in Article 8.2 of the Framework Directive. 
No one has challenged this as an appropriate analytical framework. Ofcom found that Principle 1 
was satisfied. It found that Principle 3 was not satisfied, but it was overruled on that point by the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, and there has been no appeal against its decision on that point. 
Accordingly the outcome of this appeal turns on the application of Principle 2. Ofcom found that 
Principle 2 was “not sufficiently likely to be met”. 
Ofcom concluded that Principle 2 was not satisfied. It expected BT to bear the burden of positively 
demonstrating that the proposed tariff changes would be beneficial to consumers. In brief, as Lord 
Sumption said at [23], “what Ofcom decided was that although the direct and the indirect effect of 
BT’s proposed price changes could be expected to result in lower prices for consumers, BT should not 
be allowed to make the changes because it was not possible to forecast how far mobile network 
operators would be able to compensate themselves by increasing other charges.” 
In [2011] CAT 24, the Tribunal took the opposite view in the sense that BT was entitled prima 
facie to change its charges and that, if Principles 1 and 3 were satisfied, “Ofcom could reject a 
proposed change only if the welfare test distinctly showed that they would adversely affect consumer 
welfare.”10 Ofcom and the Tribunal were agreed that the welfare test was inconclusive and the 
difference in the consequence flowed from a difference in how uncertainty should be handled in such 
cases. Each approach has risks. On the one hand one can prevent change that might turn out to be 
beneficial to consumers on the other one can allow change that might disbenefit consumers. What the 
Tribunal recognised was that an undue fetter on commercial freedom is itself a disbenefit to 
consumers.
11
 
It is worth expanding on why the Tribunal thought that BT was entitled prima facie to change its 
charges and on how the Supreme Court addressed each of those reasons: 
                                                     
9
 There is provision for the parties to elect some other form of dispute resolution but that optional election did not happen 
in this case. 
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 Lord Sumption at [25] 
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 The Tribunal at [396] 
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 The first reason was straightforward contractual entitlement in the Standard Interconnect 
Agreement subject to dispute resolution; 
 The second was that this innovative approach to pricing was itself a mode of competing and that 
interference would restrict competition; and 
 The third deserves setting out in the words of the Tribunal since it is important to note that the 
Tribunal does NOT contradict Hutchison [2005] CAT 39 at [130], reiterated in T-Mobile [2008] 
CAT 12 at [90-91], by suggesting that a finding of SMP is required before resolving a dispute. 
However it does caution against using dispute resolution to introduce effective price control 
where none of the parties’ relevant prices are subject to regulatory control flowing from findings 
of SMP. 
“442.  Principle 2(ii) is concerned with the distortion of competition. We have found 
that the introduction of the NCCNs would not have the effect of distorting competition 
(see paragraphs 385 to 397 above). What is more, we consider that the imposition of a 
stringent test for the introduction of price changes by BT itself has the effect of 
distorting competition, by placing a restraint on pricing freedom not only on BT, but on 
any other terminating CP which might wish to introduce similar pricing structures to 
those contained in the NCCNs. We are mindful that price control is an intrusive form of 
control which, elsewhere in the 2003 Act, can only be introduced by SMP condition. 
None of the parties to the dispute were subject to regulatory control as regards the prices 
for 080, 0845 or 0870 calls nor as regards the prices for terminating such calls: see 
paragraphs 392 to 395 above. 
443.  We consider that these are powerful indicators in favour of allowing BT to 
introduce the new prices.” 
In other words, if you want to impose price controls you need a good reason and, in this case, there 
was not one. 
Contractual freedom 
The Supreme Court noted that BT’s freedom was limited by contract and regulation – in other words 
their freedom to vary the prices was limited both by established English law of contract and by the 
specifics of the CRF. That meant that BT was obliged to act: 
 “in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously”, [37]; 
 “consistently with its contractual purpose”, [37]; and 
 within limits which are fixed by the objectives of Article 8 Framework Directive, [37]. 
As Lord Sumption explained at [38]:  
Ofcom “is bound to start from the parties’ contractual rights and may override them only if that is 
required by the Article 8 objectives. However, under Clause 12 of the Interconnection Agreement, 
this is a conflict which cannot arise, because BT has no contractual right to require a price 
variation which is not consistent with the Article 8 objectives. In this case, therefore, Ofcom’s 
function was to determine whether BT’s proposed charges exceeded the limits of its contractual 
discretion. That depends on whether they were in fact consistent with the Article 8 objectives. This 
is where the three principles applied by Ofcom, including the welfare test and the competition test, 
come in.”  
Here the prospective welfare test had been inconclusive. 
His Lordship, at 43, saw the CRF as “market-oriented and essentially permissive” and therefore it 
was inconsistent to apply “an extreme form of the precautionary principle to a dynamic and 
competitive market”. He did qualify that, in [44], by adding that Ofcom should not be inhibited “from 
blocking a price variation which on a balance of probabilities was unlikely to be adverse, but which if 
things went wrong would be catastrophic”. His Lordship also said at the end of that paragraph: 
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“It is right to add that if and when sufficiently adverse effects were to materialise at some point in 
the future, Ofcom has power to intervene to address them at that stage.” 
Anti-competitive effect of price control  
He then turned to the question of there being an anti-competitive effect of price control. He was clear, 
at [46] about the tasks in the circumstances of this case: 
 “...in resolving this particular dispute, Ofcom was not exercising a regulatory function, but 
resolving a dispute under the unchallenged terms of an existing agreement.”; 
 “The CAT was hearing an appeal by way of rehearing on the merits. Their conclusion about the 
anti-competitive effects of restricting price changes and the weight to be attached to it was a 
factual judgment which it was perfectly entitled to make.” Since appeals from the CAT are only 
on a point of law, it was unappealable on this factual judgment. 
Lord Sumption said, at [46]: 
“According to the CAT’s analysis, the effect of not allowing BT to introduce innovative charging 
structures was itself anticompetitive because innovative pricing structures are an effective mode of 
competing. This was clearly a relevant consideration, even if it was not a conclusive one: see 
Article 8.2(b) of the Framework Directive. It was not a consideration taken into account by 
Ofcom. Since the right to introduce the proposed pricing package brought benefits for competition, 
the mobile network operators should have to justify their demand that the package should be 
rejected by pointing to some countervailing detriments to consumers disclosed by the welfare test 
if it were to be accepted. An inconclusive welfare test could not be enough for this purpose.” 
Significant Market Power as a test 
We have already seen that SMP is not necessary for Ofcom to impose obligations relating to prices in 
dispute resolution. At [47], the Supreme Court found it  
“unnecessary to consider the CAT’s third reason for requiring the mobile network operators to 
show a distinct disbenefit to consumers in order to justify rejecting a proposed change to 
interconnection charges. This was that the rejection of BT’s proposed charges amounted to 
imposing price control on an entity such as BT which had not been designated as having 
significant market power in a relevant market.”  
Lord Sumption noted that BT had sought a ruling “that the Common Regulatory Framework can never 
authorise Ofcom to reject a price variation unless it would leave an efficient operator unable to cover 
its costs.” He was unconvinced; the Article 8 objectives still come into play even without SMP but 
further argument on this point is for another case. This was a point that might have merited a reference 
to the CJEU but that was unnecessary to determining the instant case, [50]: “the centrality of the 
interconnection terms in the scheme of the Directives is obvious and no convincing reason has been 
put forward by any of the parties or interveners for ignoring them.” 
As his Lordship said in [49]:  
“The whole scheme of the Directives is to leave the arrangements for interconnection to the parties 
unless there are grounds for regulatory intervention. The permissible grounds of regulatory 
intervention in the case of a CP without significant market power are that the interconnection 
terms have been framed or are being operated in a manner which is inconsistent with end-to-end 
connectivity or conflicts with the Article 8 objectives. If the result of the welfare test and the 
competition test is that there is no positive reason to believe that the effects will be adverse, there 
is no justification for regulatory intervention.” 
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Ethernet [2014] CAT 14 
The most recent substantive judgment of the CAT in dispute resolution has been in the Ethernet set of 
appeals, Cases numbered 1205, 1206 and 1207 which led to [2014] CAT 14 and now to requests for 
permission to further appeals that suggest re-examination of what the CRF provides. This case is 
distinguishable from the last one in that there had been a finding of SMP from which followed a 
requirement that prices be cost oriented. 
By way of summary of the CAT judgment:  
1) BT appealed on six grounds, arguing that: Ofcom misinterpreted and misapplied an SMP 
Condition HH3.1 which imposed on BT what is commonly referred to as a cost orientation 
obligation and, had it applied the condition correctly, the overcharge found would have been 
considerably lower (Grounds 1 and 2); Ofcom’s approach violated the principles of legal certainty 
(Ground 3); a number of adjustments should be made to BT’s regulatory financial statements 
(“RFS”) that would reduce the amount of the overcharge (Ground 4); Ofcom has no power to 
order repayment of sums ‘paid without dispute’ by the other CPs, albeit in breach of a cost 
orientation obligation (Ground 5); and, in the alternative to Ground 5, Ofcom incorrectly exercised 
its discretion by ordering full repayment (Ground 6). 
2) Sky/TalkTalk appealed on three grounds: Ofcom was wrong to assess compliance with Condition 
HH3.1 on the basis of only the distributed stand alone cost measure and, had Ofcom applied the 
correct cost test, it would have found significantly higher levels of overcharging (Ground 1); 
Ofcom should have made a regulatory asset value adjustment to BT’s RFS, which would also have 
increased the overcharge figure (Ground 2); and BT was wrong not to order the payment of 
interest on the sums to be repaid to BT (Ground 4). Sky/TalkTalk abandoned a further ground of 
appeal (Ground 3) following service of Ofcom’s defence.  
3) The remaining appellants appealed on a single ground, arguing that Ofcom was wrong not to order 
the payment of interest on the sums to be repaid by BT. 
For the reasons set out in the judgment [2014] CAT 14, the Tribunal:  
 allowed, in part, Ground 4 of BT’s appeal insofar as it concerned the adjustment to BT’s rental 
costs in respect of the exclusion of excess construction costs; and 
 allowed Sky/TalkTalk and the remaining appellants’ appeals as regards the payment of interest. 
In all other respects, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals of BT and Sky/TalkTalk, and invited the 
parties to make written submissions as to the appropriate directions that the Tribunal should 
make in the light of the judgment. 
Other current cases 
As indicated above these are (i) a fresh dispute about 08x numbers, Case number 1195, and (ii) 
another appeal from a dispute resolution determination, also about such non-geographic numbers, 
1211, both were stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision and are now underway again. 
Details of all CAT cases are available on the website 
catribunal.org.uk 
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Conclusion 
Returning to the question of whether the task of dispute resolution is about adjudication or regulation, 
there are clearly elements of both in the approach taken in the CRF and therefore in the United 
Kingdom.  
We should not lose sight of the ideal that effective and innovative competition coupled to the law 
of contract is the best way forward. Therefore we should not forget that, though each NRA and 
appellate body must maintain vigilance in the light of article 8 objectives and their duty to promote 
competition and consumer welfare, each should be cautious not to interfere unduly in the competitive 
process when imposing solutions on competing providers. 
Adam Scott 
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Annex Extracts from the CRF Directives as amended 
Access Directive 2002/19/EC as amended 
Recitals 
(5) In an open and competitive market, there should be no restrictions that prevent undertakings 
from negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves, in particular on cross-
border agreements, subject to the competition rules of the Treaty. In the context of achieving a more 
efficient, truly pan-European market, with effective competition, more choice and competitive services 
to consumers, undertakings which receive requests for access or interconnection should in principle 
conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and negotiate in good faith. 
(6) In markets where there continue to be large differences in negotiating power between 
undertakings, and where some undertakings rely on infrastructure provided by others for delivery of 
their services, it is appropriate to establish a framework to ensure that the market functions effectively. 
National regulatory authorities should have the power to secure, where commercial negotiation fails, 
adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of end-users. In 
particular, they may ensure end-to-end connectivity by imposing proportionate obligations on 
undertakings that control access to end- users. Control of means of access may entail ownership or 
control of the physical link to the end-user (either fixed or mobile), and/or the ability to change or 
withdraw the national number or numbers needed to access an end-user's network termination point. 
This would be the case for example if network operators were to restrict unreasonably end-user choice 
for access to Internet portals and services. 
(7) National legal or administrative measures that link the terms and conditions for access or 
interconnection to the activities of the party seeking interconnection, and specifically to the degree of 
its investment in network infrastructure, and not to the interconnection or access services provided, 
may cause market distortion and may therefore not be compatible with competition rules. 
(8) Network operators who control access to their own customers do so on the basis of unique 
numbers or addresses from a published numbering or addressing range. Other network operators need 
to be able to deliver traffic to those customers, and so need to be able to interconnect directly or 
indirectly to each other. The existing rights and obligations to negotiate interconnection should 
therefore be maintained. .... 
(9) Interoperability is of benefit to end-users and is an important aim of this regulatory 
framework. Encouraging interoperability is one of the objectives for national regulatory authorities as 
set out in this framework, which also provides for the Commission to publish a list of standards and/or 
specifications covering the provision of services, technical interfaces and/or network functions, as the 
basis for encouraging harmonisation in electronic communications. Member States should encourage 
the use of published standards and/or specifications to the extent strictly necessary to ensure 
interoperability of services and to improve freedom of choice for users. 
(15) The imposition of a specific obligation on an undertaking with significant market power does 
not require an additional market analysis but a justification that the obligation in question is 
appropriate and proportionate in relation to the nature of the problem identified. 
(16) Transparency of terms and conditions for access and interconnection, including prices, serve 
to speed-up negotiation, avoid disputes and give confidence to market players that a service is not 
being provided on discriminatory terms. Openness and transparency of technical interfaces can be 
particularly important in ensuring interoperability. Where a national regulatory authority imposes 
obligations to make information public, it may also specify the manner in which the information is to 
Dispute Resolution: adjudication or regulation? 
15 
be made available, covering for example the type of publication (paper and/or electronic) and whether 
or not it is free of charge, taking into account the nature and purpose of the information concerned. 
(17) The principle of non-discrimination ensures that undertakings with market power do not 
distort competition, in particular where they are vertically integrated undertakings that supply services 
to undertakings with whom they compete on downstream markets. 
(19) Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of increasing 
competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of an infrastructure owner to 
exploit its infrastructure forits own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities 
that are essential for the provision of competing services. Where obligations are imposed on operators 
that require them to meet reasonable requests for access to and use of networks elements and 
associated facilities, such requests should only be refused on the basis of objective criteria such as 
technical feasibility or the need to maintain network integrity. Where access is refused, the aggrieved 
party may submit the case to the dispute resolutions procedure referred to in Articles 20 and 21 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). An operator with mandated access obligations cannot 
be required to provide types of access which are not within its powers to provide. The imposition by 
national regulatory authorities of mandated access that increases competition in the short- term should 
not reduce incentives for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will secure more 
competition in the long-term. The Commission has published a Notice on the application of the 
competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector which addresses these issues. 
National regulatory authorities may impose technical and operational conditions on the provider 
and/or beneficiaries of mandated access in accordance with Community law. ... 
(20) Price control may be necessary when market analysis in a particular market reveals inefficient 
competition. The regulatory intervention may be relatively light, such as an obligation that prices for 
carrier selection are reasonable as laid down in Directive 97/33/EC, or much heavier such as an 
obligation that prices are cost oriented to provide full justification for those prices where competition 
is not sufficiently strong to prevent excessive pricing. In particular, operators with significant market 
power should avoid a price squeeze whereby the difference between their retail prices and the 
interconnection prices charged to competitors who provide similar retail services is not adequate to 
ensure sustainable competition. When a national regulatory authority calculates costs incurred in 
establishing a service mandated under this Directive, it is appropriate to allow a reasonable return on 
the capital employed including appropriate labour and building costs, with the value of capital 
adjusted where necessary to reflect the current valuation of assets and efficiency of operations. The 
method of cost recovery should be appropriate to the circumstances taking account of the need to 
promote efficiency and sustainable competition and maximise consumer benefits. 
Access Directive continued 
Article 3 
General framework for access and interconnection 
1. Member States shall ensure that there are no restrictions which prevent undertakings in the 
same Member State or in different Member States from negotiating between themselves agreements 
on technical and commercial arrangements for access and/or interconnection, in accordance with 
Community law. The undertaking requesting access or interconnection does not need to be authorised 
to operate in the Member State where access or interconnection is requested, if it is not providing 
services and does not operate a network in that Member State. 
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Article 4 
Rights and obligations for undertakings  
1.  Operators of public communications networks shall have a right and, when requested by other 
undertakings so authorised in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 2002/20/EC (Authorisation 
Directive), an obligation to negotiate interconnection with each other for the purpose of providing 
publicly available electronic communications services, in order to ensure provision and 
interoperability of services throughout the Community. Operators shall offer access and 
interconnection to other undertakings on terms and conditions consistent with obligations imposed by 
the national regulatory authority pursuant to Articles 5 to 8 
... 
Article 5 
Powers and responsibilities of the national regulatory authorities  
with regard to access and interconnection  
1. National regulatory authorities shall, acting in pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 8 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), encourage and where appropriate ensure, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Directive, adequate access and interconnection, and the interoperability of 
services, exercising their responsibility in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, 
efficient investment and innovation, and gives the maximum benefit to end-users. 
... 
3. With regard to access and interconnection referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall 
ensure that the national regulatory authority is empowered to intervene at its own initiative where 
justified in order to secure the policy objectives of Article 8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework 
Directive), in accordance with the provisions of this Directive and the procedures referred to in 
Articles 6 and 7, 20 and 21 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive).  
Article 13 
Price control and cost accounting obligations  
1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, impose 
obligations relating to cost recovery and price controls, including obligations for cost orientation of 
prices and obligations concerning cost accounting systems, for the provision of specific types of 
interconnection and/or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective 
competition means that the operator concerned may sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may 
apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users. To encourage investments by the operator, 
including in next generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the 
investment made by the operator, and allow him a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital 
employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project. 
2. National regulatory authorities shall ensure that any cost recovery mechanism or pricing 
methodology that is mandated serves to promote efficiency and sustainable competition and maximise 
consumer benefits. In this regard national regulatory authorities may also take account of prices 
available in comparable competitive markets. 
3. Where an operator has an obligation regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the burden of 
proof that charges are derived from costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall lie 
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with the operator concerned. For the purpose of calculating the cost of efficient provision of services, 
national regulatory authorities may use cost accounting methods independent of those used by the 
undertaking. National regulatory authorities may require an operator to provide full justification for its 
prices, and may, where appropriate, require prices to be adjusted. 
Framework Directive 2002/21/EC 
Recitals 
(27) It is essential that ex ante regulatory obligations should only be imposed where there is not 
effective competition, i.e. in markets where there are one ormore undertakings with significant market 
power, and where national and Community competition law remedies are not sufficient to address the 
problem. It is necessary therefore for the Commission to draw up guidelines at Community level in 
accordance with the principles of competition law for national regulatory authorities to follow in 
assessing whether competition is effective in a given market and in assessing significant market 
power. National regulatory authorities should analyse whether a given product or service market is 
effectively competitive in a given geographical area, which could be the whole or a part of the territory 
of the Member State concerned or neighbouring parts of territories of Member States considered 
together. An analysis of effective competition should include an analysis as to whether the market is 
prospectively competitive, and thus whether any lack of effective competition is durable. Those 
guidelines will also address the issue of newly emerging markets, where de facto the market leader is 
likely to have a substantial market share but should not be subjected to inappropriate obligations. The 
Commission should review the guidelines regularly to ensure that they remain appropriate in a rapidly 
developing market. National regulatory authorities will need to cooperate with each other where the 
relevant market is found to be transnational. 
(32) In the event of a dispute between undertakings in the same Member State in an area covered 
by this Directive or the Specific Directives, for example relating to obligations for access and 
interconnection or to the means of transferring subscriber lists, an aggrieved party that has negotiated 
in good faith but failed to reach agreement should be able to call on the national regulatory authority to 
resolve the dispute. National regulatory authorities should be able to impose a solution on the parties. 
The intervention of a national regulatory authority in the resolution of a dispute between undertakings 
providing electronic communications networks or services in a Member State should seek to ensure 
compliance with the obligations arising under this Directive or the Specific Directives 
Article 3a. 
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, national regulatory authorities 
responsible for ex ante market regulation or for the resolution of disputes between undertakings in 
accordance with Article 20 or 21 of this Directive shall act independently and shall not seek or 
take instructions from any other body in relation to the exercise of these tasks assigned to them 
under national law implementing Community law 
... 
Article 4 
Right of appeal 
1. Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level under which any 
user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks and/or services who is affected by 
a decision of a national regulatory authority has the right of appeal against the decision to an appeal 
body that is independent of the parties involved. This body, which may be a court, shall have the 
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appropriate expertise available to it to enable it to carry out its functions effectively. Member States 
shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an effective appeal 
mechanism. 
Pending the outcome of any such appeal, the decision of the national regulatory authority shall stand, 
unless interim measures are granted in accordance with national law 
... 
Article 8 
Policy objectives and regulatory principles 
1. Member States shall ensure that in carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in this Directive 
and the Specific Directives, the national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures which are 
aimed at achieving the objectives set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Such measures shall be 
proportionate to those objectives. Member States shall ensure that in carrying out the regulatory tasks 
specified in this Directive and the Specific Directives, in particular those designed to ensure effective 
competition, national regulatory authorities take the utmost account of the desirability of making 
regulations technologically neutral. National regulatory authorities may contribute within their 
competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and 
linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism. 
2. The national regulatory authorities shall promote competition in the provision of electronic 
communications networks, electronic communications services and associated facilities and services 
by inter alia: 
(a) ensuring that users, including disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, 
price, and quality; 
(b) ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic 
communications sector; 
(c) encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and 
(d) encouraging efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio frequencies and 
numbering resources. 
3. The national regulatory authorities shall contribute to the development of the internal market 
by inter alia: 
(a) removing remaining obstacles to the provision of electronic communications networks, 
associated facilities and services and electronic communications services at European level; 
(b) encouraging the establishment and development of trans-European networks and the 
interoperability of pan-European services, and end-to-end connectivity; 
(c) ensuring that, in similar circumstances, there is no discrimination in the treatment of 
undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services; 
(d) cooperating with each other and with the Commission in a transparent manner to ensure 
the development of consistent regulatory practice and the consistent application of this 
Directive and the Specific Directives. 
4. The national regulatory authorities shall promote the interests of the citizens of the European 
Union by inter alia: 
(a) ensuring all citizens have access to a universal service specified in Directive 2002/22/EC 
(Universal Service Directive); 
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(b) ensuring a high level of protection for consumers in their dealings with suppliers, in 
particular by ensuring the availability of simple and inexpensive dispute resolution procedures 
carried out by a body that is independent of the parties involved; 
(c) contributing to ensuring a high level of protection of personal data and privacy; 
(d) promoting the provision of clear information, in particular requiring transparency of 
tariffs and conditions for using publicly available electronic communications services; 
(e) addressing the needs of specific social groups, in particular disabled users; and 
(f) ensuring that the integrity and security of public communications networks are 
maintained. 
Article 20 
Dispute resolution between undertakings 
1. In the event of a dispute arising in connection with obligations arising under this Directive or 
the Specific Directives between undertakings providing electronic communications networks or 
services in a Member State, the national regulatory authority concerned shall, at the request of either 
party, and without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2, issue a binding decision to resolve the 
dispute in the shortest possible time frame and in any case within four months except in exceptional 
circumstances. The Member State concerned shall require that all parties cooperate fully with the 
national regulatory authority. 
2. Member States may make provision for national regulatory authorities to decline to resolve a 
dispute through a binding decision where other mechanisms, including mediation, exist and would 
better contribute to resolution of the dispute in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 8. The national regulatory authority shall inform the parties without delay. If after four months 
the dispute is not resolved, and if the dispute has not been brought before the courts by the party 
seeking redress, the national regulatory authority shall issue, at the request of either party, a binding 
decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest possible time frame and in any case within four months. 
3. In resolving a dispute, the national regulatory authority shall take decisions aimed at achieving 
the objectives set out in Article 8. Any obligations imposed on an undertaking by the national 
regulatory authority in resolving a dispute shall respect the provisions of this Directive or the Specific 
Directives. 
4. The decision of the national regulatory authority shall be made available to the public, having 
regard to the requirements of business confidentiality. The parties concerned shall be given a full 
statement of the reasons on which it is based. 
5. The procedure referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 shall not preclude either party from 
bringing an action before the courts. 
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